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Abstract
Financial constraints are often thought as representing a barrier to entry for
new firms, thus potentially limiting competition in product markets. We inves-
tigate the relationship between finance and product market competition in the
context of a general equilibrium, two-sector model. The analysis highlights the
role played by firm heterogeneity as well as by the level and distribution of wealth.
Financial development may lead to lower markups (and thus to more competi-
tive markets) in financially dependent sectors, even when it reduces the number
of firms and increases standard market concentration indexes. The analysis im-
plies that incumbency is not a sufficient condition for determining opposition to
financial liberalization. It also implies that, for a given level of imperfect financial
development, poorer countries will tend to have less competitive product markets.
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1. INTRODUCTION 1
1 Introduction
Is financial development conducive to greater product market competition in financially
dependent sectors? In particular, does it matter for the equilibrium number and size of
firms, as well as for the markups these firms charge? Haber (2000) performs a compara-
tive study of the cotton industry in Brazil and Mexico during a period of liberalization of
the financial sector in both countries, namely from 1880-1930. He argues that financial
liberalization resulted in an improvement in the competitive environment and a decrease
in concentration indexes, in particular in Brazil, the country that underwent the most
effective financial market reform. Rajan and Zingales (2003) contend that an important
element in the development of financial markets – or lack thereof – is the ability of
incumbent firms in financially dependent sectors to limit the development of those mar-
kets. Incumbents’ motivations for opposing financial development would stem from the
fact that a more developed financial market breeds competitive behavior and reduces
the profitability of established firms. Finally, Cetorelli and Strahan (2006) find that
higher concentration in local U.S. banking markets increases the hurdles to potential
entrants in nonfinancial sectors. While financial development and greater competition
in the financial sector are not synonymous, they do share the important property of
being associated with greater fund availability to prospective entrepreneurs.
These examples from the literature are representative of a more general notion that
financial development is somehow favorable to competition. This belief probably arises
from the fact that financial constraints represent a barrier to undertaking financially
dependent activities and may thus limit entry and –potentially– competition in the cor-
responding product/service markets. Interestingly, although various functions of the
financial system have been the object of intense study (see Levine, 1997), to our knowl-
edge, no formal analysis of the relationship between finance and product market compe-
tition or market structure has been carried out. The goal of the present paper is to fill
in this gap. An additional goal is to shed light on the political economy issues regarding
the forces that favor or oppose financial liberalization/development.
1
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The financial sector performs a variety of roles,1 such as the facilitation of risk hedg-
ing, the exertion of corporate control and the allocation of savings to projects. In this
paper we focus on the financial sector in its role of allocating funds from multiple savers
toward investment projects. The analysis is done in the context of a general equilibrium,
two-sector model, with heterogeneous agents. The latter may differ with respect to their
productivity levels as well as to their wealth holdings. One sector (sector 1) is finan-
cially dependent in the sense that its output depends on the amount of capital used, and
that capital may need to be borrowed from the financial system. It is also imperfectly
competitive, with firms competing a la Cournot. In the presence of unfettered financial
markets, entrepreneurs are able to invest their optimal amount. When financial markets
are not available (or restricted), output is limited by the entrepreneur’s private wealth.
In the other sector (sector 2), productivity is independent of capital and the market
structure is perfectly competitive. There is free entry in both sectors.
We use this model to compute the general equilibrium with and without financial
markets.2 In particular, we are interested in providing answers to the following questions:
How does financial deepening affect the quantity and price of the goods produced in
capital dependent sectors? What happens to the number of firms in these sectors when
financial imperfections are eliminated? What happens to the degree of product market
competition, as measured by standard indicators of market shares and markups? What
is the role played by the level and distribution of wealth?
As expected, we find that financial markets make the financially dependent sector
expand and its price drop. This seems consistent with the finding of Rajan and Zin-
gales (1998) that industries more dependent on external finance grow relatively faster
in more financially developed countries. It is an implication of the fact that financial
development expands asymmetrically the economy’s production possibilities frontier.
The implications for the number of firms, firm size, market concentration indexes and
markups are more intricate. Financial development may, in general, lead to both entry
1See Levine (1997) for a comprehensive survey.
2One could easily consider intermediate cases of financial market imperfections without affecting the
main results.
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and exit in the financially dependent sector. Producers who owned their presence in
that sector more to their wealth than to their ability will be driven out. At the same
time, depending on the level and distribution of wealth and ability, new firms may be
created by able but previously constrained agents. The net effect depends on the level
and distribution of wealth. In general, relatively wealthy countries will tend to experi-
ence a decrease in the number of firms. Average firm size will go up and so may standard
concentration measures. The effect on the number of firms is ambiguous for low income
countries.
What happens to markups? The answer again depends on the level of wealth as well
as on the distribution of ability and wealth. If per capita wealth is relatively low and
wealth and ability are not correlated, then the development of financial markets lowers
markups. If, on the other hand, the level of wealth is relatively high then concentration
increases, both in terms of number of firms and market shares for the largest firms.
Notwithstanding the reduction in the number of firms, the effect on markups cannot be
fully signed, but it is conceivable, if not likely, that markups decrease in this economy
too.
The model thus reveals the existence of interesting, potentially conflicting patterns
in the behavior of commonly used measures of “competition.” Changes in the number
of firms (or changes in concentration indexes) and the size of markups may be positively
related – rather than negatively related as is commonly presumed. One should then be
careful in interpreting an increase in concentration as being necessarily harmful, at least
in the presence of heterogenous producers and additional distortions (such as financial
imperfections). But if markups go down, then our analysis suggests that financial devel-
opment (or liberalization) has positive economic effects that go beyond those that have
been identified in the existing literature regarding the improvement in the allocation of
resources.
The model also has implications that are relevant for two other literatures. One
regards the relationship between wealth (income) and productivity. For a given level
of imperfect financial development, our analysis indicates that poorer countries will be
3
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more likely to have less competitive markets (as measured by markups) than richer coun-
tries, and hence lower production per capita. This seems consistent with both anecdotal
evidence and the arguments of Parente and Prescott (1998) about market structure in
less developed countries. The other literature regards the political economy of financial
liberalization. A popular view is that the development of financial markets is hindered
by the power of incumbents. This includes both incumbent financial institutions that are
concerned about competition in the financial market, as well as incumbent firms that
fear that a more competitive financial system will finance entrants into their sectors.
The model shows that incumbency may not be sufficient to characterize preferences to-
wards financial liberalization. There may be incumbents who will support liberalization
(efficient but undercapitalized producers), as well as incumbent who may object to it
(efficient and well capitalized firms). It is the fact that financial markets tend to favor
disproportionately the most efficient but poorly capitalized producers that can account
for such divisions within the class of incumbent firms.
The paper proceeds as follows. In the next section, we present our model. Sec-
tion 2 describes the model, results are presented in section 3, section 4 provides some
generalizations, and section 5 concludes.
2 The Model
2.1 The Environment
Preliminaries The economy is populated by a finite number of individuals N . In-
dividuals differ with respect to their ability levels and private wealth holdings. Let A
and K denote the corresponding sets of ability and wealth. We have A = {aj}Nj=1 and
K =
{
k̄l
}N
l=1
. Individual i is defined by a pair
(
ai, k̄i
)
∈ A×K, i = 1, . . . , N . K̄ denotes
the economy’s global endowment of capital, given by
∑
i k̄i. Ability and wealth holdings
are publicly observed and common knowledge. F (a, k) denotes the joint cdf of ability
and wealth in the economy.3
3We make the assumption of finite N since it seems more in line with deviations from price-taking
behavior. However, in the remainder of the paper, we effectively treat the economy as continuous.
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Production There are two goods produced in this economy. Good 1 requires capital
as an input. If individual i works in sector 1, its output qi is
qi = aik
β
i , (1)
with β ∈ (0, 1). ki is the amount of capital individual i invests in production.
Output in sector 2 is independent of ability and, moreover, it does not require the
use of any capital. If individual i chooses to work in sector 2, he produces A units of
good 2.
In the presence of financial markets, individuals may borrow capital if their desired
scale of operations exceeds their individual capital holdings. Without financial markets,
individual investment is constrained to satisfy:
ki ≤ k̄i. (2)
Since the ability to borrow affects the scale of individual production in sector 1 but not
in sector 2, sector 1 is said to be a financially dependent sector.
Consumption Individuals have utility defined over two goods. Given consumption
vector (c1, c2), total utility is
u (c1, c2) = log (c1) + γ log (c2) ,
for γ > 0. Let p be the relative price of good 1 in terms of good 2.
Wealth endowments, k̄l ∈ K, are expressed in units of good 2. The income, li, of an
individual i who chooses to operate in sector 1 is:
li = k̄i + (pqi (ki)− ki) .
and that of one who operates in sector 2:
li = A+ k̄i.
Individuals buy (or sell) the difference between k̄i and ki at the price of one. If they
choose to work in sector 1, quantity choice qi will solve a standard problem of profit
maximization a la Cournot, spelled out below.
5
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The timing is as follows. Individuals first select the sector in which they wish to
work and engage in production. Then, markets for both goods open and consumption
takes place.
Aggregate Demand The budget constraint for i is:
pc1i + c
2
i = li.
Given income level li, demand for goods 1 and 2 is:
c1i =
1
p
li
1 + γ
, c2i =
γ
1 + γ
li.
Since Engel curves are straight lines from the origin, we have a representative agent
economy. Aggregate demand depends only on aggregate income (the sum of individual
income across individuals) and not on how it is distributed. Define
I ≡
N∑
i=1
li,
so that I is aggregate income. Aggregate demand for good j, denoted Cj, is then
C1 =
1
p
I
1 + γ
, (3)
C2 =
γ
1 + γ
I. (4)
The inverted demand curve for good 1 is:
p =
1
C1
I
1 + γ
. (5)
The log preference format dictates that the (absolute value of the) elasticity of demand
of good 1 with respect to its relative price p equal 1. For later use, we note that the
relative demand schedule of good 1 in terms of good 2 is:
C1
C2
=
1
p
I
1+γ
γ
1+γ
I
=
1
p
1
γ
. (6)
Relative demand of good 1 does not depend on aggregate income and is a negative
function of the relative price p.
Next, we examine the economy without financial constraints.
6
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2.2 Financially Unconstrained Economy
We first describe how a firm that has chosen sector 1 selects its optimal level of produc-
tion. We then describe how firms choose their sector of activity.
2.2.1 Optimal Choice of Level of Production in Sector 1
Consider individual i, whose ability endowment is ai. Profits from operating in sector 1
are:
π1i = p (Q1) qi − ki = p (Q1) qi −
(
qi
ai
) 1
β
, (7)
where qi is the quantity produced by individual i, ki the amount of capital used, Q1 the
total output of good 1 produced, and p (Q) the inverse demand curve for good 1. We
assume that sector 1 is characterized by quantity competition a la Cournot, while sector
2 is perfectly competitive. Let Q1 i denote the output of good 1 by producers other than
i. Then,
Q1 = qi +Q1 i.
Under Cournot competition, each firm chooses output qi taking the quantities of the
remaining firms Q1 i as given. The first-order condition for firm i is:
p
(
1− qi
Q1
)
= MC (qi) , (8)
where MC (qi) indicates firm i’s marginal cost. We thus obtain the familiar result that
the price to marginal cost ratio, the markup, equals (1− qi/Q1)−1. Using the expression
for the production function to relate qi and ki, and inserting into (8) yields:
p
(
1− qi
Q1
)
=
1
β
(
1
ai
) 1
β
(qi)
1−β
β . (9)
Clearly, MC (qi) is strictly increasing in qi.
Equation (9) defines firm i’s optimal quantity qi in terms of the relative price p, total
market output Q1, and level of efficiency, ai. Optimal quantity qi is strictly increasing
in ability. Holding p and Q1 constant, more able firms will have greater market shares
and higher markups than less able ones. Since the marginal cost declines with ability,
more able firms are more profitable than less able ones.
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Equation (9) allows us to determine the optimal quantity produced by firm i, q?i . It
can be written as:
q∗i = q
∗
i
(
+
p,
+
Q1,
+
ai
)
. (10)
The first-order condition (8) can also be written in terms of capital:
βai (p+ p
′) = k1−βi .
It follows that more able firms choose a larger scale of production. Together with the
properties of qi in (10), we have:
k∗i = k
∗
i
(
+
p,
+
Q1,
+
ai
)
. (11)
Figure ?? displays the optimal investment schedule k∗i (·).
2.2.2 Optimal Choice of Sector of Activity
Individuals choose to work in the sector that generates the highest income. Individual
i will choose sector 1 if
max
qi
π1i (qi; ai, p, Q1) ≥ A. (12)
The profit function is an increasing function of ability. Under appropriate assumptions
on the distribution of ability and the parameters of the model, there exists a level of
ability, ã, such that
π (q∗ (p, ã, Q1) ; ã, p, Q1) = A. (13)
The ability level ã is the threshold determining the separation of entrepreneurs into
activities: those whose ability exceeds ã work in sector 1 whereas the remaining work in
sector 2. This threshold is implicitly defined by equation (13) as a function of p and Q1:
ã = ã (p,Q1) . (14)
Once the choice of activity has been made and production completed, the aggregate
supply of good 1, Q1, is given by
Q1 =
ā∑
ai≥ã(Q1,p)
q∗i
(
+
p,
+
ai,
+
Q1
)
. (15)
8
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Entrepreneurs engaged in the production of good 1 use good 2 as an input. Total
input demand for good 1 production, K∗, is:
K∗ =
ā∑
ai≥ã(Q1,p)
(
q∗i
ai
) 1
β
. (16)
Let Q2 denote the total quantity of good 2 produced in the economy:
Q2 =
∑
ai≤ã(Q1,p)
A. (17)
We define K as the difference between the initial endowment of capital, K̄ and the
amount of capital used up in production in sector 1, K∗:
K = K̄ −K∗.
The quantity of good 2 available for consumption is then simply
C2 = Q2 +K. (18)
2.2.3 The Equilibrium
Definition 1 An equilibrium in the financially unconstrained economy is a triple
(
ã, p, {qi}Ni=1
)
,
with Q1 =
∑N
i=1 qi, such that:
i) qi satisfies (8) for ai ≥ ã and is equal to zero for ai < ã;
ii) C1 = Q1, C2 = Q2 +K;
iii) Equation (6) is satisfied.
In order to construct the equilibrium we proceed as follows. First we use (13) to
solve for ã = ã (p,Q1) (see figure 1). Substituting this expression into (15), (17) and
(16) yields Q1, Q2 and K
∗, respectively, as functions of p. Substituting Q1 for C1 and
Q2 +K for C2 in (6) determines p. In our economy, an unconstrained equilibrium exists
and is unique.4
4Since marginal cost is increasing, the production of greater quantities of good 1 requires increasing
amounts of capital as well as an increasing number of entrepreneurs. Both forces show that, as C1
increases, an increasingly greater amount of C2 must be foregone to generate an extra unit of C1.
This shows that the consumption possibilities frontier of the economy is strictly concave. The log (·)
preference format generates strictly convex indifference curves and, therefore, the tangency point is
unique.
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2.3 Financially constrained economy
We now discuss the determination of the equilibrium in this economy in the absence of
financial markets.5 The superscript c is used to indicate equilibrium values in the con-
strained economy. Let qci denote individual i ’s output in the constrained environment.
If this entrepreneur cannot use external funds, then his production in sector 1 cannot
exceed the level that could be financed by his own initial capital stock, k̄i:
qci = min{aik̄
β
i , ai(k
∗
i )
β} (19)
where k∗i is determined by equation (11). Unlike the financially unconstrained economy,
the choice of activity now depends on both individual ability and individual wealth. Let
us consider the minimum amount of capital, kmin that makes an individual of ability
level a indifferent between the two sectors. kmin(a, p) is thus determined by the equation:
paik
β
min − kmin = A. (20)
Equation (20) defines a relationship between ability and capital. It can be verified that
kmin(a, p) is decreasing and convex in ability. Since a higher price raises profits for given
levels of ability and capital, an increase in p shifts the kmin (·) schedule downwards.
The threshold ability level for the choice of activity in the financially constrained
economy, ãc, as well as the corresponding amount of capital, kmin(ã, p), are then de-
termined by combining equations (11) and (20). All individuals with ability a ≥ ãc
who have wealth k ≥ kmin(a) will operate in sector 1. The rest, those who are not
simultaneously able and rich enough to operate in sector 1, will work in sector 2.
The introduction of financial constraints will make at least some of the entrepreneurs
financially constrained. Some of them will afford ( have sufficient funds) to stay in sector
1 but will operate below their optimal capacity. The rest will move to sector 2. Figures
2 and 3 offer two examples of a financially constrained equilibrium under the assumption
that all individuals have a common level of initial wealth, k̄i = k̄. And that this common
5While for reasons of simplicity we study an economy without any asset trade, our analysis is
applicable to more general environments with asset markets but with restricted asset trade.
10
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level is such that in Figure 2 some entrepreneurs are able to achieve their optimal capacity
(those with a ≥ a′). While in Figure 3 none of them can achieve their optimal scale of
production.
The Equilibrium
Definition 2 An equilibrium in the financially constrained economy is a triple
(
ãc, pc, {qci}
N
i=1
)
,
with Qc1 =
∑N
i=1 q
c
i =
∑N
i=1 ai(k
c
i )
β, such that:
ia. ki
c = min{k?i , k̄} if kic ≥ kmin and zero otherwise
ib. k?i satisfies (11) and kmin satisfies (20)
ii. C1 = Q1, C2 = Q2 +K
iii. Equation (6) is satisfied.
Conditions (ia-ib) state that a firm will operate in sector 1 if it is profitable and
affordable to do so. If it operates in this sector, it will either produce its optimal
quantity –if unconstrained– or, if constrained, the quantity allowed by its capital stock.
3 The effects of financial markets
3.1 Finance and the Allocation of Resources
We now study the implications of the elimination of financial markets for the allocation
of resources, the number of firms in sector 1, equilibrium markups and the relative price
p. We start by assuming that the initial level of wealth is the same for all agents, k̄i = k̄
for all i, and that the financial constraint binds for at least some agents. We consider
two cases, one with high per capita wealth and the other with low per capital wealth.
In the first one, the common level of per capita wealth k̄ exceeds the demand for capital
by the marginal firm in the unconstrained economy. That is,
k∗i (p
u, Qu1 , ã
u) < k̄. (21)
This is the “high” per capita wealth situation depicted in Figure 2. In the second case
(the low wealth case, Figure 3), the level of per capita wealth is below the optimal
investment scale of the marginal firm in the unconstrained economy, k∗i (p
u, Qu1 , ã
u) > k̄.
11
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These two cases will provide helpful insights concerning the effects of imperfect fi-
nancial intermediation. We discuss later the implications of using a more general speci-
fication of the wealth distribution. Note that, under the current wealth distribution, the
equilibrium number of firms in sector 1 varies monotonically – and inversely – with ã:
higher values of this threshold are associated with a lower number of good 1 producers.
We establish that, independently of the level of wealth, the equilibrium relative
price of the financially dependent good, p, is higher in the absence of financial markets
(Proposition 1) while its quantity, Q1 is lower (Proposition 3). The change in the number
of firms is ambiguous and depends on the level of initial –per capita– wealth (Proposition
4). If this level is sufficiently high (a notion to be made more precise in Proposition 4),
then the elimination of financial markets brings about an expansion in the number of
firms operating in the financially dependent sector, while firm size shrinks. On the other
hand, if initial wealth is low, then the number of firms in this sector decreases. In the
next subsection we examine the implications of these changes for markups. Interestingly,
we find that markups may increase –making the market less competitive– irrespective
of what happens to the number of firms.
Let
(
pu, ãu, {qui }
N
i=1
)
denote the equilibrium in the unconstrained economy, and(
pc, ãc, {qci}
N
i=1
)
denote the equilibrium in the constrained economy. The proofs of the
following propositions can be found in the appendix.
Proposition 1 The financially constrained economy has a higher relative price of the
financially dependent good.
Proposition 2 In the high wealth economy, the introduction of financial constraints
results in firm entry into sector 1: ãc < ãu.
Proposition 3 Production of the financially dependent good is lower in the constrained
economy.
Proposition 4 Let kmin(ã
u, pc) represent the minimum scale required by firm ãu (the
threshold firm in the unconstrained equilibrium) in order to find it profitable to remain
12
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in sector 1 (equation 20). There will be firm exit following the introduction of financial
constraints if k̄ < kmin(ã
u, pc).
In a sufficiently wealthy economy, that is, in an economy where the condition in
Proposition 4 is violated, the imposition of financial constraints will be associated with
an increase in the number of firms in the financially dependent sector. In a low wealth
economy, on the other hand, firm exit will take place following the elimination of finan-
cial markets.6 In the latter case, all the firms that remain in sector 1 are financially
constrained.
Proposition 5 If the introduction of financial constraints leads to firm exit, then all
firms operating in the financially dependent sector will be financially constrained.
In the case of entry, either all or only some of the remaining firms are financially
constrained. Without further assumptions it is not possible to offer any general results
on these properties of the constrained equilibrium.
These propositions establish that the elimination of financial markets leads to a
higher price and a lower quantity for the financially dependent good. This lower level
of output may be produced by a smaller or larger number of firms, depending on the
level (and also distribution) of wealth in the economy. Can anything be said about the
behavior of various concentration indexes, as well as of markups?
3.2 Finance and Competition
Markups The firms operating in the financially constrained sector after the shut-
down of financial markets can be partitioned into three groups: new entrants (NE),
unconstrained incumbent firms (UI), and constrained incumbent firms (CI). In the low
wealth economy, only the last group is present. In the high wealth economy, all groups
6Note that our usage of the concept of high or low wealth is related but does not completely cor-
respond to customary usage. This is because our classification into high or low wealth status relies on
kmin(ãu, pc)− k̄, rather than k̄ alone. As such, it depends also on the distribution of ability as well as
on the various determinants of the relative price (productivity, preferences and so on). Nonetheless, for
countries that differ mostly along the wealth dimension, our usage and the customary one coincide.
13
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are present. For the first two groups, markups are determined from the firm’s first-order
condition, equation (8). They are given by:
p
MCi
= ψi = (1−
qi
Q1
)−1. (22)
For the financially constrained CI group, the markup is:
p
MCi
=
p
MC
(
q(k)
) . (23)
Proposition 6 The introduction of financial constraints leads to an increase in the
market shares of the financially unconstrained incumbent firms (UI).
Proposition 7 Incumbent firms charge a higher mark up when they are financially
constrained.
Proposition 6 implies that markups unambiguously increase in a low wealth, finan-
cially constrained economy when there is firm exit. This is because the firms that remain
in the market are those that had the highest market shares – and thus the higher markups
– in the unconstrained economy. And these firms now have even higher markups because
they face a higher price and have lower marginal costs (due to the fact that they produce
less).
The situation is more complicated when there are new entrants (NE). This group
consists of firms whose markups may be below those of the marginal firm in the economy
with asset markets. The new entrants are firms with a higher marginal cost than the
(previously) marginal firm. But they also face a higher price, and so the net effect is
ambiguous. In the low wealth case, since all firms producing good 1 are financially
constrained and thus produce the same quantity, it is possibly to show that a standard
measure of markups such as the Lerner index increases. In the high wealth economy,
however, without information on the exact distribution of output across firms, it is not
possible to sign the change in that index. Nevertheless, it can be established that an
14
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“unweighted” version of the Lerner index (the unweighted sum of markups across all
firms) is lower in the unconstrained economy.
Define µci for firm i in the constrained economy as:
µi ≡
pc −MCci
pc
,
and let µui be defined similarly. Then:
Proposition 8 A. The unweighted Lerner concentration index in sector 1 is strictly
lower in the financially unconstrained economy. That is:∑
ai≥ã(pc,Qc1)
(µci) <
∑
ai≥ã(pu,Qu1)
(µui ) .
B. The standard Lerner concentration index in sector 1 is lower in a low wealth, finan-
cially unconstrained economy.
Part A means that the simple sum of the markups on the marginal unit of all firms
is lower in the financially unconstrained equilibrium. Part B implies that the market
share–weighted sum of markups across all firms is also lower in a low wealth economy.
Consequently, financial development (liberalization) makes the markets for financially
dependent goods in low wealth countries more competitive. Do the changes in firm
concentration point in the same direction?
Concentration indexes Let us order the firms by size so that 1 represents the largest
firm, 2 the second largest firm and so on. The Hj index of the market share of the j
largest firms is defined as:
Hj ≡
j∑
i=1
qi
Q1
.
Under the two wealth distributions considered above, it is always the case that the
largest firms are financially constrained, and thus produce less in the constrained econ-
omy. Let r represent the set of financially constrained firms in this economy. We have:
15
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Proposition 9 The concentration ratio Hj is strictly higher in the financially uncon-
strained economy for j ≤ r.
Note that the group of financially constrained firms does not necessarily contain only
firms that produce less and have lost market share as a result of the imposition of financial
constraints. It is possible that some of these firms became financially constrained because
they expanded their production levels relative to the unconstrained environment. These
will be the smallest firms within the set of financially constrained ones. Nevertheless,
it is still the case that the market share of the incumbent constrained firms as a whole
declines with the introduction of financial constraints (due to the existence of the new
entrants), and this implies that the largest firms unambiguously lose market share.
How does financial development affect Hj when j > r? A subset of the j firms ex-
pands production and gains market share. This subset includes the firms in the UI group
and possibly firms in the CI group that expanded their output (though suboptimally).
The remaining firms lose market share. These are a subset of the CI firms. While there
is a presumption that greater concentration will prevail (because it is the larger firms
that expand), without additional assumptions on the structure of the economy it may
not be possible to sign the total effect. The only thing that can be said with certainty, in
addition to Proposition 8, is that the average market share – the ratio of total output Q1
to the number of producers – does increase with financial development (liberalization)
in the high wealth economy.
Our analysis thus shows that financial development (or liberalization) may affect
standard measures of firm concentration and competition differently. A regulator ex-
amining developments in sector 1 may witness an increase in the average market share
as well as greater concentration among the largest producers. But if he could measure
marginal costs, he would also observe that incumbent firms have reduced their markups
and that the average markup may have gone down. What conclusion is to be drawn in
such a situation?
Concentration and efficiency are usually interpreted as monotonic measures of con-
sumer well-being (i.e. lower concentration and lower markups/Lerner indexes are usually
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seen as conducive to a larger consumer surplus). However, firm concentration measures
are not good indicators of consumer well-being in a second-best world with financial
constraints (or, presumably, other distortions). In fact, more able producers produce
larger quantities at lower total cost than less able ones. They do so while charging a
higher markup: they are able to produce the last unit at a strictly lower marginal cost
compared to lesser able entrepreneurs. As such, shifting output toward these firms – and
raising concentration – would be in the best interest of consumers provided such added
concentration would not result in an endogenous increase in markups. The analysis
shows that the removal of financial constraints may bring about such benefits.
4 Additional considerations
More General Distribution of Wealth The joint distribution of wealth and ability
considered in the previous section is special because it is degenerate along the wealth
dimension (everybody has the same endowment of capital). It can be extended in two
distinct ways. It can be made to depend on the level of ability while maintaining the
assumption that there is a single level of capital corresponding to any particular level of
ability. Or, instead of having the agents being distributed over the line with regard to
individual wealth, they can be distributed over a two dimensional plane. That is, several
individual of different levels of wealth may share the same level of ability and there is
positive mass at all levels of ability. Of course, these two extensions could be combined
to have the most general case of a non-degenerate distribution of wealth over the two
dimensional plane. The effects of introducing dependence between the distributions
of ability and wealth are both obvious and difficult to pin down quantitatively without
imposing further structure. Allowing the agents to be distributed over a two dimensional
plane is equivalent to combining several capital lines like the k̄ line in Figures 2 or 3.
Some of these lines may even involve unconstrained agents across the whole ability range.
The main difference from the analysis in the previous section is that the imposition of
financial constraints may now trigger both entry and exit in market 1. The new entrants
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will be those entrepreneurs whose ability a is such that a ∈ [ãc, ãu], and whose wealth
places them above the kmin (·) schedule. The firms exiting the market, have ability
levels above ãu, and wealth levels below the kmin (·) schedule. These are very able but
poor entrepreneurs, who need to borrow in order to be in sector 1. Without further
assumptions one cannot unambiguously determine the net effect on the number of firms
or average markups.
Another difference regards the effects of financial development on the standard Hj
indexes. While propositions 1-8 could still obtain under plausible generalizations of the
wealth distribution, proposition 9 would not. Consider, for example the case with two
wealth classes, k̄1 and k̄2 with k̄2 > k̄1. Suppose that for agents with ki = k̄2 the
financial constraint is never binding, independent of the level of ability. And for agents
with ki = k̄1 the financial constraint is binding at high levels of ability. This means that
in the constrained equilibrium, some of the largest firms are unconstrained and thus
have a larger market share relative to the case with unconstrained financial markets.
Thus standard concentration may decrease following financial liberalization if the most
productive firms have sufficient own funds to achieve their optimal scale of production
under the financially constrained environment.
The Case of Homogeneous Ability We have also studied the special case of a
homogeneous level of ability, ai = a for all i. As in the more general case, the pattern of
firm entry and exit, the level of mark ups and the change in the concentration indexes
varies with the distribution of wealth and cannot be signed unambiguously. As before,
to the extent that there exist some firms that are not financially constrained, financial
liberalization is likely to decrease concentration indexes.
Political Economy Considerations The model can be used to study the political
economy of financial liberalization/development. Which groups in the population would
favor and which ones would oppose liberalization?
In general, in the financially constrained economy there are three groups: Two in
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sector 1, namely, financially unconstrained and financially constrained firms. And one
in sector 2. Following financial liberalization, some firms from sector 1 (constrained and
unconstrained) will exit while some firms from the sector 2 will enter sector 1. The
welfare of some of these groups can be unambiguously signed. For instance, those who
remain in sector 2 as well as those who leave sector 2 and enter sector 1 are better off.
The former because the purchasing power of their output, A, increases due to the lower
p. And the latter because they can always do at least as well as the former group by
opting to stay in sector 2. For the other groups the situation is more nuanced because
while the change in the level of profits can be signed, the implications for consumption
(and utility) are harder to derive. Nonetheless, an interesting implication of our analysis
is that incumbency does not necessarily imply opposition to liberalization. One of the
reasons for this is that some of the incumbent firms may be financially constrained and
hence unable to achieve their optimal scale of production. Consequently, it is to be
expected that the firms operating in sector 1 may not speak with a single voice on issues
of financial liberalization. While firms (or individuals) outside the sector may have more
homogeneous views and in all likelihood favor financial liberalization.
Empirical Implications In an influential paper, Rajan and Zingales, 1998, have
studied the effects of financial development on the growth rate of financially dependent
industries. They decompose industry growth into growth in the number of establish-
ments and growth in the average size of existing establishments. They state that their
“... estimates suggest that financial development has almost twice the economic effect
on the growth of the number of establishments as it has on growth of the average size
of establishments7 The analysis in our paper does not contain a growth mechanism so it
cannot be used to deal with ongoing growth. Nonetheless, it can still be used to address
the issue of how the increase (growth) in output of financially dependent sectors that
results from the amelioration of the financial constraints can be divided into the two
7But at the same time they also report that, in explaining the relative growth of industries, the
dependence of the young firms was lower than that of the mature firms. This seems to point in the
opposite direction.
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sources of growth discussed by Rajan and Zingales. As discussed above the number of
firms may increase or decrease following the loosening of the financial constraints, de-
pending on, among other things, the level and distribution of wealth. When the number
of firms increases, it is quite possible for the model to generate a growth rate in the
number of establishments that exceeds the growth rate in the average size of establish-
ments (and vice versa). A similar pattern could be generated not through the level of
wealth but through dependence of the distributions of wealth and ability. For instance,
assuming that most of the rich are able but there are also many able who are poor would
deliver the same pattern.
5 Conclusion
The effects of financial development (or financial liberalization) on the allocation of
resources, economic growth and welfare have been extensively studied in the literature.
There is one aspect, though, that has been completely ignored, notwithstanding a widely
held belief that it is of great importance for economic performance and welfare. Namely,
the relationship between finance and competition in product markets. In this paper we
have taken a first step in characterizing the effects of the existence of financial constraints
on competition. Admittedly, the analysis has been carried out in a framework that
has been restricted in order to make it feasible to study such a complicated issue. For
instance, the nature of the financial constraints has not been modelled. They correspond
closer to unspecified costs of asset trade than to the elaborate agency problems typically
discussed in the literature. Dynamics have been abstracted from. And so on.
Nevertheless, a number of novel insights emerge that are likely to also arise in more
general environments. First, under a relatively flat distribution of income, in poor
countries financial development increases competition in product markets. And it is
likely to do the same in rich countries. Second, the standard measures of competition
used by policymakers (various firm concentration indexes) may be misleading in the
evaluation of the effects –and hence, of the desirability– of policies regarding financial
liberalization. Higher concentration may well be associated with an improvement in
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the competitive environment. This suggests that it may be necessary to carry out such
evaluations in models –such as ours– that allow for meaningful heterogeneity in efficiency
across firms. Third, not only does the distribution of wealth but also per capita wealth
plays an important role in the determination of the degree of competition in product
markets. Poorer countries are likely to have less competitive markets and hence stand
to benefit more from financial liberalization. And forth, being an incumbent firm (and
even a large sized one) does not automatically create a bias in favor of opposition to
financial liberalization. Some of the incumbent firms stand to benefit the most from
liberalization.
There is a number of demanding but important extensions awaiting. One could
involve the incorporation of dynamics, so that both the cross section and time series
properties of the distribution of firms in financially dependent sectors could be derived.
Another one might involve the endogenization of financial constraints.
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6 Appendix
Proposition 1: The financially constrained economy has a higher relative price of the
financially dependent good.
Proof.
i. Let us shut the financial markets down and hold, for the moment, p fixed. Without
borrowed capital, the output of the financially constrained firms will decrease as these
firms are now forced to operate below their optimal capacity.
i1.In the high wealth case, the financially unconstrained firms will also reduce their
optimal output due to equation 8. Since the price is being held constant, lower quantities
imply lower profits and there is firm exit. Thus, Q1 and C1 decrease while K and Q2 and
consequently C2 increases. At p
u condition 6 is no longer satisfied and there is excess
demand for good 1.
i2. In the low wealth case, kmin(ã) > k̄, so there is also firm exit. This reinforces the
reduction in Q1 and leads –as in case (i1) above– to excess demand for good 1.
ii) How can the excess demand for good 1 eliminated? It requires the increase in its
relative price, p. An increase in p has two effects: First, it increases the optimal quantity
of the unconstrained firms (if there are any) due to equation 8. (Note from 8 that both
higher p and higher Q1 raise the optimal quantity qi and so the effects reinforce each
other.) The higher price has additional effects. Holding quantities constant, profits of
incumbent firms increase. In addition, the optimal quantity has increased as well (for
unconstrained firms), and this pushes profits even higher. Higher profits induce entry
due to equation 20. Both of these changes contribute to a higher C1 and a lower C2,
thus helping to restore 6.
Proposition 2 In the high wealth economy, the introduction of financial constraints
results in firm entry into sector 1: ãc < ãu.
Proof. Suppose now, for contradiction, that the new equilibrium value of ã could
exceed ãu. For this to be possible, and given that the new equilibrium price will be
higher than before, pc > pu, it must be the case that the optimal quantities produced
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by unconstrained incumbents are lower than before. This is a necessary condition for
the new k∗ (·) and kmin (·) schedules to cross to the right of ãu, given that Proposition 1
establishes a lower p in equilibrium.
Note that, if ãc > ãu and optimal quantities are lower, since
C2 = K −
∑
a≥ã
(
qi
ai
) 1
β
+
∑
a<ã
A,
the equilibrium value of Cc2 will be higher than C
u
2 . This is so since there are fewer firms
in sector 1 – and therefore more of good 2 is produced – and the remaining firms in
sector 1 are fewer and produce less than before – so less good 2 is demanded as an input
into good 1 production. From equation (4), it follows that Ic > Iu must hold as well.
Finally, it must also be the case that Cc1 < C
u
1 since there are fewer producers of good
1 and each produces less than before.
Consider now the first-order condition for good 1 production:
p
(
1− qi
Q1
)
= MC (qi) ⇐⇒
I
1 + γ
1
Q1
(
1− qi
Q1
)
= MC (qi) .
Under common regularity conditions,8 when I is fixed, a lower Q1 leads firms to increase
their output. Therefore, for lower qi to be optimal, it must be the case that I has
declined (lower I and lower Q1 are still compatible with a higher output price ). This,
however, contradicts the fact that Cc2 > C
u
2 . 
Proposition 3. Production of the financially dependent good is lower in the constrained
economy: Qc1 < Q
u
1 .
8These amount to assuming that the best-response function of individual firms is negatively sloped.
In our model, that will always be the case for firm i provided its market share satisfies:
2
qi
Q1
− 1 < 0.
In words, firm i’s output must be smaller than half the total output of good 1. When firms are small –
an assumption we made earlier in treating the economy as continuous – this assumption will always be
met.
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Proof. We consider the two cases corresponding to firm entry or exit. Recall that firm
exit can only occur when k(ãu) > k̄. This means that, in the constrained economy, there
is a smaller number of producers left in sector 1, all of which produce strictly less that
what they would have produced in the unconstrained economy (because k̄ < k?u(a) for
a > ãu). Therefore, Qc1 < Q
u
1 follows immediately. Consider now the case when there is
entry into sector 1, so that there are fewer producers of good 2 and, as a consequence,
Q2 declines. Assume that Q
c
1 > Q
u
1 . Because (at least) the most efficient firms are
constrained, it must be the case that K∗ (Qc1) > K
∗(Qu1). Therefore, K
c < Ku and,
since Qc2 < Q
u
2 (recall ã
u < ãc), Cc2 < C
u
2 violating the property of equilibrium that
(C1/C2)
c < (C1/C2)
u. 
Proposition 4: Let kmin(ã
u, pc) represent the minimum scale required by firm ãu (the
threshold firm in the unconstrained equilibrium) in order to find it profitable to operate
in sector 1 (equation 20). There will be firm exit following the introduction of financial
constraints if k̄ < kmin(ã
u, pc).
Proof. Consider Figure 3. A move from the unconstrained to the constrained economy
results in a downward shift in the kmin schedule due to p
c > pu (see equation 20).
The shift in the k? is ambiguous as the higher p and lower Q1 pull in opposite directions
(equation 10). Do these two curves intersect to the left or the right of ãu? Intersection at
a value a > ãu would imply that the ãu firm would have a minimum scale that exceeded
its optimal scale and would thus choose not to operate in sector 1 even if it could afford
to do so. This, however, cannot be true because this firm could always profitably choose
to remain in sector 1 and simply produce the same amount it was producing before,
namely, q(ãu) as pcq(ãu) − C(q(ãu)) − A > puq(ãu) − C(q(ãu)) − A = 0. Hence, the
curves must intersect to the left of ãu. Let a′ and k′ denote the values of a and k at this
intersection. If k̄ > k′ then all a ∈ [a′, ãu) enter. Consider now the case when k′ > k̄,
and define the following threshold â:
kmin (p
c, â) = k̄.
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Ability level â corresponds to the intersection of the schedule kmin (p
c, a) with the wealth
level k̄. If this ability level is lower than ãu, then entry will occur and all entrepreneurs
with ability a ∈ [â, ãu) join sector 1. Exit will occur when â > ãu. Since kmin (·) is a
decreasing schedule, â > ãu implies that kmin (ã
u, pc) > k̄. 
Proposition 5: If the introduction of financial constraints leads to firm exit, then all
firms operating in the financially dependent sector are financially constrained.
Proof. When there is firm exit, the new marginal firm will correspond to the intersection
of the kmin schedule and the horizontal line k̄. Because the kmin schedule is downward
sloping, this intersection occurs to the right of the intersection of kmin and k
∗. This means
that the new marginal firm is producing using k̄ < k∗. Since all other producers have
higher ability, they would demand even more capital than the marginal firm. Therefore,
all good 1 producers are financially constrained.
More generally, it can be seen that the composition of firms in terms of constrained
and unconstrained firms depends on the location of k̄ in relationship to k′. In particular,
if k̄ > k′ (see proposition 4) then there are some unconstrained firms in sector 1. If
k′ > k̄ then all firms are constrained. 
Proposition 6. The introduction of financial constraints leads to an increase in the
market shares of the financially unconstrained incumbent (UI) firms.
Proof. Suppose instead that their market shares went down. This would require pro-
duction by the unconstrained firms to decline proportionately more than the decline in
total output Q1. Since p has gone up, (8) would no longer be satisfied: its left-hand
side went up while the right-hand side decreased (due to the fact that marginal cost is
increasing). 
Proposition 7: The markups of incumbent firms increase once financial constraints are
introduced.
Proof. Consider first a high wealth economy. In this economy, there are different
types of incumbent firms, unconstrained and constrained ones. In the latter group
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there exist two further sub-categories. The group of firms that produce less than in the
unconstrained equilibrium (the most able ones). And the group of firms that produce
more than in the unconstrained equilibrium. These are the firms that became financially
constrained because they expanded their production in order to take advantage of the
higher price (the intermediate ability ones). For the incumbent, unconstrained firms,
Proposition 6 implies higher markups. Similarly, for the incumbent, constrained ones
that lowered their production, equation (22) implies higher mark ups too. What about
the markups of the last group, the constrained firms that increased their production?
The optimal mark up for the firms in this group –that is, the markup they would charge
if they were not financially constrained– goes up because their optimal market share
increases. But because these firms are constrained, they produce less than the optimal
amount, face a lower marginal cost and hence a higher markup relative to their optimal
one.
The low wealth economy is straightforward since all firms in sector 1 are financially
constrained. The proof that incumbents charge higher markups is the same as in the
high wealth case. 
Proposition 8: A. The unweighted Lerner concentration index in sector 1 is strictly
lower in the financially unconstrained economy. That is:∑
ai≥ã(pc,Qc1)
(µui ) <
∑
ai≥ã(pu,Qu1)
(µci) .
B. The standard Lerner concentration index in sector 1 is lower in a low wealth, finan-
cially unconstrained economy.
Proof. Part A Equation (8) implies that
µi =
p−MCi
p
=
qi
Q1
for unconstrained firms. For constrained firms, µi > qi/Q1. Therefore, in a financially
unconstrained economy,
µu =
∑
ai≥ã(pu,Qu1)
µui =
∑
ai≥ã(pu,Qu1)
qi
Q1
Q1 = 1.
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In the constrained economy, however,
µu =
∑
NE
µui +
∑
UI
µui +
∑
CI
µui >
∑
NE
qi
Q1
+
∑
UI
qi
Q1
+
∑
CI
qi
Q1
= 1.
Therefore, the sum of the markups for all the marginal units produced by all firms is
lower in the financially unconstrained equilibrium. 
Proof. Part B. In the low wealth economy all firms produce the same quantity. Thus
the unweighted and standard Lerner indexes coincide. 
Proposition 9. The concentration ratio Hj is strictly higher in the financially uncon-
strained economy for j ≤ n.
Proof. It follows immediately from Proposition 6. 
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Figure 1: Equilibrium in the financially unconstrained economy
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Figure 2: Equilibrium in the financially constrained economy: High wealth
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Figure 3: Equilibrium in the financially constrained economy: Low wealth
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